We study the expressive power of fragments of inclusion and independence logic defined either by restricting the number of universal quantifiers or the arity of inclusion and independence atoms in formulas. Assuming the so-called lax semantics for these logics, we relate these fragments of inclusion and independence logic to familiar sublogics of existential second-order logic. We also show that, with respect to the stronger strict semantics, inclusion logic is equivalent to existential second-order logic.
Introduction
Independence logic [15] and inclusion logic [11] are recent variants of dependence logic. Dependence logic [20] extends first-order logic by dependence atomic formulas =(x 1 , . . . , x n )
the meaning of which is that the value of x n is completely determined by the values of x 1 , . . . , x n−1 . The semantics of dependence logic is defined using sets of assignments rather than a single assignment as in first-order logic. Independence logic replaces the dependence atoms by independence atoms y⊥ x z, the intuitive meaning of which is that, with respect to any fixed value of x, the variables y are totally independent of the variables z. In inclusion logic dependence atoms are replaced by inclusion atoms x ⊆ y, meaning that all the values of x appear also as values for y. We study the expressive power of the syntactic fragments of these logics defined either by restricting the number of universal quantifiers or the arity of the independence and inclusion atoms in sentences. These results are proved with respect to lax semantics. We also show that, under strict semantics, inclusion logic is equivalent to existential second-order logic ESO while, by a recent result of Hella and Galliani [3] , with lax semantics inclusion logic is equivalent to greatest fixed point logic, and hence to LFP (and PTIME) over finite (ordered) structures.
Since the introduction of dependence logic (D) in 2007 many interesting variants of it have been introduced. In fact the team semantics of dependence logic has turned into a general framework for logics in which various notions of dependence and independence can be formalized. Dependence logic has a very intimate and well understood connection to ESO dating back to the results of [17, 8, 22] on Henkin quantifiers. For some of the new variants and concepts in this area the correspondence to While dependence logic and independence logic are both equivalent to ESO in expressive power [20, 15] , for inclusion logic only containment in ESO has been shown [11] . Furthermore, the expressive power of various natural syntactic fragments of independence and inclusion logics is not understood at the moment. The starting point of our work were the results of [7] on the fragments D(k∀) and D(k-dep) of dependence logic. The fragment D(k∀) contains those D-formulas in which at most k variables have been universally quantified, and in the formulas of D(k-dep) dependence atoms of arity at most k may appear (atoms of the form =(x 1 , . . . , x n ) satisfying n ≤ k + 1). The following results were shown in [7] :
1. D(k-dep) = ESO f (k-ary),
D(k∀) ≤ ESO f (k∀) ≤ D(2k∀)
where ESO f (k-ary) is the fragment of ESO in which the quantified functions and relations have arity at most k, and ESO f (k∀) consists of ESO-sentences that are in Skolem Normal Form and contain at most k universal first-order quantifiers. The equivalence in (1) was used to show that in D(k-dep) even cardinality of a k + 1-ary relation cannot be expressed using the result of Ajtai [2] . On the other hand, since ESO f (k∀) = NTIME RAM (n k ) < NTIME RAM (n k+1 )
by [14] and [6] , an infinite expressivity hierarchy for the fragments D(k∀) was shown using 2. Above NTIME RAM (n k ) denotes the family of classes of τ -structures that can be recognized by a non-deterministic RAM in time O(n k ). In [11] it was observed that independence logic and inclusion logic can be given two alternative semantics called strict and lax semantics. For dependence logic these two semantics coincide in the sense that the meaning of any D-formula is the same under both interpretations. For independence and inclusion logic formulas this is not the case as shown in [11] . In fact, we will show that, with respect to strict semantics, inclusion logic is equivalent to ESO, while by a recent result of Hella and Galliani [3] , with lax semantics inclusion logic is equivalent to greatest fixed point logic. In the rest of the article we consider the expressive power of fragments of independence logic and inclusion logic with lax semantics. First we look at fragments defined analogously to D(k-dep) of dependence logic. We let FO(⊥ c )(k-ind) contain those independence logic sentences in which independence atoms with at most k + 1 different variables may appear. Similarly in the sentences of FO(⊆)(k-inc) only inclusion atoms of the form a ⊆ b, where | a| = | b| ≤ k may appear. Our results show that Then we consider the analogoues of D(k∀) in the case of FO(⊥) = FO(⊥ c ) [21] , which is the sublogic of independence logic allowing only so-called pure atoms y⊥ z, and FO(⊥, ⊆). We show that
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some basic properties and results regarding dependence logic and its variants. In Section 3 we compare the strict and lax semantics and in Section 4.1 relate the arity fragments of independence logic and inclusion logic with that of ESO. Finally, in Section 4.2 we consider fragments defined by restricting the number of universally quantified variables.
Preliminaries

Team Semantics
Team semantics is a generalization of Tarski semantics in which formulas are interpreted by sets of assignments, called teams, rather than by single assignments. In this subsection, we will recall the definition of team semantics for first order logic. We will assume that all our formulas are in negation normal form. Also, all structures considered in the paper are assumed to have at least two elements.
Definition 2. Let M be a first-order model and V a finite set of variables. Then
• a team X over M with domain Dom(X) = V is a finite set of assignments from V to the domain M of M;
• for a tuple v of variables in V , we write X( v) for the set {s( v) : s ∈ X} of all values that v takes in X, where s( v) := (s(v 1 ), . . . , s(v n ));
• for a subset W of V , we write X ↾ W for the team obtained by restricting all assignments of X to the variables in W .
• For a formula φ, the set of free variables of φ is denoted by Fr(φ).
There exist two variants of team semantics, called respectively strict and lax, which differ with respect to the interpretation of disjunction and existential quantification. Informally speaking, the choice between strict and lax semantics corresponds to the choice between disallowing or allowing nondeterministic strategies in the corresponding semantic games. 1 We first give the definition of the lax version of team semantics; later, we will discuss some of the ways in which strict semantics differs from it. If M |= X φ, we say that X satisfies φ in M; and if a sentence (that is, a formula with no free variables) φ is satisfied by the team {∅}, 2 we say that φ is true in M and we write M |= φ.
In the team semantics setting, formulas φ and ψ are said to be logically equivalent, φ ≡ ψ, if for all models M and teams X, with
′ , if every L-sentence φ is equivalent to some L ′ -sentence ψ, and vice versa.
The following result can be proved by structural induction on the formula φ:
Theorem 4 (Flatness). For all first order formulas φ and all suitable models M and teams X, the following are equivalent:
3. For all s ∈ X, M |= s φ according to Tarski semantics.
Dependencies in Team Semantics
The advantage of team semantics, and the reason for its development, is that it allows us to extend firstorder logic by new atoms and operators. For the purposes of this paper, the following atoms, inspired by database-theoretic dependency notions 3 , are of particular interest:
• Let x be a tuple of variables and let y be another variable. Then = ( x, y) is a dependence atom, with the semantic rule TS-dep: M |= X =( x, y) if and only if any two s, s ′ ∈ X which assign the same value to x also assign the same value to y;
• Let x, y, and z be tuples of variables (not necessarily of the same length). Then y ⊥ x z is a conditional independence atom, with the semantic rule TS-ind: M |= X y ⊥ x z if and only if for any two s, s ′ ∈ X which assign the same value to x there exists a s ′′ ∈ X which agrees with s with respect to x and y and with s ′ with respect to z.
Furthermore, we will write x ⊥ y as a shorthand for x ⊥ ∅ y, and call it a pure independence atom;
• Let x and y be two tuples of variables of the same length. Then x ⊆ y is an inclusion atom, with the semantic rule TS-inc: M |= X x ⊆ y if and only if X( x) ⊆ X( y);
Given a collection C ⊆ {=(. . .), ⊥ c , ⊆} of atoms, we will write FO(C) (omitting the set parenthesis of C) for the logic obtained by adding them to the language of first-order logic. With this notation dependence logic, independence logic and inclusion logic are denoted by FO(= (. . .)), FO(⊥ c ) and FO(⊆), respectively. We will also write FO(⊥) for the fragment of independence logic containing only pure independence atoms.
All formulas of all the above-mentioned logics satisfy the two following properties: Furthermore, we have the two following results for dependence logic:
Proposition 8 (Downwards Closure). For all models M, dependence logic formulas φ and teams
X, if M |= X φ then M |= Y φ for all Y ⊆ X.
Theorem 9 ([22, 8, 20]). Any dependence logic sentence φ is logically equivalent to some ESO sentence φ * , and vice versa.
What about independence logic? As shown in [15] , a dependence atom =( x, y) is logically equivalent to the independence atom y ⊥ x y, and, since independence logic is clearly contained in ESO, we have at once that Theorem 10 ( [15] ). Any independence logic sentence φ is logically equivalent to some ESO sentence φ * , and vice versa.
Furthermore,
Theorem 11 ([21]). Any independence logic formula is equivalent to some pure independence logic formula.
For inclusion logic the following is known.
Theorem 12.
1. An inclusion atom x ⊆ y is equivalent to the FO(⊥) expression
where v 1 , v 2 and z are new variables [11] .
2. Any inclusion logic sentence φ is logically equivalent to some positive greatest fixpoint logic sentence φ * , and vice versa [3] .
We conclude this subsection with two novel results, a characterization of dependence in terms of pure independence and a prenex normal form theorem for formulas of our logics.
Theorem 13. For all models M and teams
Proof. Suppose first that M |= X = ( x, y). Then there exists a function f :
for all s ∈ Y , and let Z = Y [H/w]. If we can verify that M |= Z z = x → w = y and that M |= Z xy⊥ zw, the left-to-right direction of our proof is done.
since our choice of w depends only on z, and therefore M |= Z xy⊥ zw.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a function H :
Since, again, M |= Z z = x → w = y, the only possibility is that a = b, as required.
and let x be a variable not occurring free in ψ. Then the following equivalences hold:
) where a and b are new variables.
Proof. The cases 1, 2 and 3 are proved as in Lemma 12 in [16] . We prove number 4. By Proposition 7 it is enough to prove the equivalence for teams X with Dom(X) = Fr(∀xφ ∨ ψ).
Assume first that M |= X ∀xφ ∨ ψ and x does not occur free in ψ. Then there are Y ∪ Z = X such that M |= Y [M/x] φ and M |= Z ψ. Let 0, 1 ∈ M be distinct. We extend each s ∈ X with a → 0 and b → 0, for s ∈ Y , and with a → 0 and b → 1, for s ∈ Z, and we let X ′ consist of these extended assignments. So each s ∈ X has either one or two extensions in
, and thus by
Lemma 14 allows us to show the following.
Theorem 15.
Any formula φ ∈ FO(=(. . .), ⊥ c , ⊆) is logically equivalent to some formula φ ′ such that 
It is clear that For downwards closed logics, such as dependence logic, the converse is also true.
Proposition 17 ([11]). For all dependence logic formulas φ, models M and teams X, M |= X φ holds wrt strict team semantics if and only if it holds wrt lax team semantics.
However, the same is false for both inclusion logic and independence logic. In particular, as we will now see, inclusion logic with strict semantics is equivalent to full existential second order logic, in contrast with the second item of Theorem 12.
By Theorem 9, it suffices to show that every dependence logic sentence is equivalent to some inclusion logic sentence (with strict semantics). In order to do so, we will use the following normal form theorem from [20] :
Theorem 18 ([20]). Every dependence logic sentence is equivalent to some sentence of the form
where for all i, v i is contained in x and where θ is a quantifier-free first-order formula.
As we will now show, in strict semantics the dependence atoms in (19) can be replaced by equivalent inclusion logic subformulas; and, therefore, it follows at once that (strict) inclusion logic is equivalent to dependence logic (and, therefore, to ESO) over sentences. Proof. Obvious (but note that if the F were replaced by nondeterministic choice functions H, as in the case of the lax semantics, this would not hold). 
, and h ′ ( w vy) = ms( vy) = h( q vy), as required. Conversely, suppose that M |= X ∀ q( q vy ⊆ w vy), and let s, s ′ ∈ X be such that 
Corollary 23. With strict semantics inclusion logic is equivalent to ESO.
Proof. By Lemma 21 and the Proposition 22, any sentence of the form (19) can be expressed in inclusion logic as
where for all i, w i = x\ v i ; and this implies our result.
The analogue of Theorem 7 (locality) for inclusion logic with strict semantics fails. As an especially surprising example of such an failure we now show that one can find inclusion logic sentences that count the number of assignments in a team: Proof. Let n be a natural number. We may assume that n ≥ 2 because in the case n = 1 we can just choose φ := ⊤. Let x i , for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, list variables x i,0 , . . . , x i,l where l =log(n). Let
where
Now φ is as wanted: Assume first that M |= X φ. Then there are, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, functions
when
. Let s ∈ X ′ be some arbitrary assignment. From (26) it follows that X ′ must include assignments s i , for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, such that s i ( x 0 ) = s( x i ). Also from (26) it follows that s( x i ) = s( x j ), for 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n − 1. Thus the assignments s i are distinct and therefore |X ′ | ≥ n. Because existential quantification of new variables in strict semantics preserves the cardinality of a team we deduce that X ≥ n.
Suppose then X ≥ n. By the assumption n ≥ 2, and thus we may deduce that |M | ≥ 2. Let 0 and 1 be two different members of M , and let i be the binary representation (of length l + 1) of i, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, in terms of these 0 and 1. Choose then n different assignments s 0 , . . . , s n−1 from X. We define, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1,
as follows:
where j + i is mod n. By the assumption, the variables in Dom(X) are not listed in x 0 . . . x n−1 , and thus the functions F i are consistent with the definition of existential quantification for strict semantics. Without the assumption it could be the case that different s i and s j would collapse into one assignment in the quantification procedure. Let
and each t ∈ X \ {s j | 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1} is extended in X ′ analogously to s 0 . So for each s ∈ X ′ and 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n − 1 it holds that s( x i ) = s( x j ). Also
and thus M |= X ′ 0≤i≤n−1
which concludes the proof.
The failure of locality in non-downwards closed logics with strict semantics is somewhat problematic, as it causes the interpretation of a formula to depend on the values that our assignments take on variables which do not occur in it. As a consequence, in the rest of this work we will focus on logics with lax semantics.
The expressive power of fragments
The purpose of this section is to generalize the classification of the expressive power of fragments of dependence logic of [7] to the case of other variants (with respect to lax semantics). We will consider the following fragments.
Definition 27. Let C be a subset of {=(. . .), ⊥ c , ⊥, ⊆} and let k ∈ N. Then
FO(C)(k−dep) is the class of sentences of FO(C) in which dependence atoms of the form =( z, y),
where z is of length at most k, may appear.
FO(C)(k−ind) is the class of sentences of FO(C)
in which independence atoms of the form y⊥ x z, where x y z has at most k + 1 distinct variables, may appear.
FO(C)(k−inc) is the class of sentences of FO(C) in which inclusion atoms of the form a ⊆ b,
where a and b are of length at most k, may appear.
FO(C)(k∀) is the class of sentences of FO(C) in which at most k universal quantifiers occur.
As in [7] , we will write D(k-dep) and D(k∀) for FO(=(. . .))(k−dep) and FO(=(. . .))(k∀), respectively.
Arity hierarchies
In this section we will prove that FO(⊥ c )(k-ind) = ESO f (k-ary). In particular this also implies that FO(⊥ c )(k-ind) = D(k-dep) [7] . We will also prove that
Proof. Let φ ∈ ESO f (k-ary). By [7] there exists a φ ′ ∈ D(k-dep) equivalent to φ and of the form
where z j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, is a sequence of length at most k. By [15] each dependence atom =( z, y) is equivalent to the independence atom y ⊥ z y. Therefore we can present φ ′ in the following independence logic form
where z j y j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, is a sequence of at most k + 1 different variables.
We will next show the other direction. 
Because d is listed in both b and c, it follows that
Assume that x is listed in c − a. Then x ∈ d, and thus s ′′ (x) = s(x) follows from s ′′ ( a) = s( a). For variables x is listed in c − c 0 the proof of s ′′ (x) = s ′ (x) is analogous because s( a) = s ′ ( a). This concludes the proof. Now we can prove the following proposition. In the proof we will present a translation from independence logic to ESO, where independence atoms are coded by relation variables preserving the arity of the atoms. Note that the translation presented in [15] does not preserve this property.
Proposition 30. FO(⊥
Proof. Let φ ∈ FO(⊥ c )(k-ind). By Theorem 15 we may assume that φ is in prenex normal form Q 1 x 1 . . . Q n x n θ where θ is a quantifier-free formula. By Lemma 29 we may assume that each independence atom in θ is either of the form =( z, y) or b⊥ a c where
• y is not listed in z,
• a, b and c do not share any variables,
Let us next consider the subformulas of θ. We will enumerate the subformulas of θ by θ i where i is a binary sequence encoding the location of the subformula in θ. Let θ λ := θ where λ is the empty sequence. If θ i is a conjunction (or a disjunction), then we denote its conjuncts (or the disjuncts) as θ i0 and θ i1 . Now let S := { i | θ i is a subformula of θ}, and let D and I be the subsets of S consisting of sequences i for which θ i is a dependence atom or an independence atom, respectively. Let ≤ be a partial order in S where i ≤ j if i k = j for some binary k. Then i ≤ j if and only if θ j is a subformula of θ i .
Next we will define a Φ ∈ ESO f (k-ary) equivalent to φ. First we define ϕ i for each i ∈ S inductively as follows:
Now let ϕ := ϕ λ . Then ϕ is a quantifier-free first-order formula sharing the structure of θ where the dependence and independence atoms are interpreted using new function symbols f i and relation symbols S i and T i , respectively. Let z i , for i ∈ I, list the variables in {x 1 , . . . , x n } \ Fr(θĩ). In the following, for example, ∃(S i ) i∈I denotes the prefix ∃S i1 . . . ∃S im where i 1 , . . . , i m enumerates I. So let us define Φ as
The idea behind Φ is that the relation variables S i and T i , for i ∈ I, encode a subteam X i that satisfies b ⊥ a c. Then Ω will ensure that for each s, s ′ ∈ X i with s( a) = s ′ ( a) there is s ′′ corresponding
to the values of a b c and z i such that s
The variables x ′ i and χ will ensure that s ′′ ∈ X i . We will now prove that M |= φ ⇔ M |= Φ.
Only if-part: Assume that M |= φ. Then there are functions
and M |= Y i1 θ i1 .
Let i ∈ I and assume that θ i = b ⊥ a c. Let α β γ be such that α β ∈ S 
Now it suffices to show that
For each x ′ i with Q i = ∃ we choose a value for it so that, for some t ∈ Y , the values of x , then player ∃ plays according to her strategy and chooses values for z i so that
where s ′′ is the assignment agreeing with the chosen values for a b c and z i . Now we let player ∀ play each x Since M * |= s ′′ j≤ i ϕ j , it is a straightforward induction to show that s ′′ ∈ X i . This concludes the step 3. Now using the previous, a straightforward backward induction shows that M |= X θ. It then suffices to show that there are functions
We define these functions inductively so that {∅}[
Assume that we have defined F 1 , . . . , F i successfully. We will define F i+1 as wanted. Assume first that
By the induction assumption F i+1 (s) is non-empty, though it may not be singleton in case there are multiple plays where values of x 1 , . . . , x i (or x ′ 1 , . . . , x ′ i ) agree with s. We note that
For the other direction, assume that s ∈ {∅}[
and let a ∈ M . We show that s(a/x) ∈ X ↾ {x 1 , . . . , x i+1 }. By the induction assumption s ∈ X ↾ {x 1 , . . . , x i }, and thus there is a play of x 1 , . . . , x n (or x ′ 1 , . . . , x ′ n ) that agrees with s in the first i variables. Let s ′ be the assignment corresponding to this play. Now instead of choosing s
). Let t be an assignment that corresponds to some play with these moves for the first i + 1 variables. Then t ∈ X and t ↾ {x 1 , . . . , x i+1 } = s(a/x i+1 ). This concludes the proof, and thus also the only if-part.
Note that in Φ each function or relation variable has an arity at most k. This concludes the proof.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 28 and 30.
This gives us immediately a corollary regarding inclusion logic. Recall that FO(⊆)(k-inc) denotes the class of inclusion logic sentences in which inclusion atoms of width at most k (i.e. atoms of the form a ⊆ b where | a| = | b| ≤ k) may appear.
Proof. Using item 1 of Theorem 12, we first translate inclusion logic sentences to independence logic, and then apply Proposition 30. It is easy to check that this translation takes us to ESO f (k ′ -ary), where
There is no hope of proving the other direction, since, e.g., even cardinality cannot be expressed in FO(⊆) [3] , but it is expressible in ESO f (1-ary). Next we will show that ESO f (k-ary) ≤ FO(⊥)(2k + 2-ind).
Proof. For the first inequality, note that ESO f (k-ary) = D(k-dep) by [7] , and D(k-dep) ≤ FO(⊥)(2k + 1-ind) by Theorem 13. The second inequality follows from Theorem 36.
∀-hierarchies
In this section, we will examine the fragments FO(C)(k∀). We will prove that, contrary to the case of the fragments D(k∀) [7] , the following holds:
1. If {⊥, ⊆} ⊆ C then the hierarchy collapses at level 1: FO(C) = FO(C)(1∀);
If ⊥ ∈ C then it collapses at level 2: FO(C) = FO(C)(2∀).
We will use the following result from [21] :
Proposition 39. Let φ be a FO(⊥) sentence. Then φ is equivalent to an formula of the form ∀ x∃ y(θ∧χ), where θ is a conjunction of pure independence atoms and χ is first-order and quantifier-free.
Since, as we saw in the Preliminaries, we can define inclusion atoms and conditional independence atoms in terms of pure independence atoms, it follows at once that any sentence of FO(=(. . .), ⊥ c , ⊆) is equivalent to some sentence of the above form.
Using this, we will prove that
Proof. Let φ ∈ FO(=(. . .), ⊥ c , ⊆). We will show that there exists a φ ′ ∈ FO(⊥, ⊆)(1∀) equivalent to it. As we said, we can assume that φ is of the form ∀x 1 . . . ∀x m ∃x m+1 . . . ∃x m+n (θ ∧ χ), where θ is a conjunction of pure independence atoms and χ is first-order and quantifier-free. Let us then define φ
We claim that φ ′ is equivalent to φ. Assume first that M |= φ. Then there are, for m + 1 ≤ i ≤ m + n, functions
be the constant function mapping each assignment to M . Then
For the other direction, assume that M |= φ ′ . Then there are, for 2 ≤ i ≤ m + n, functions
First let us prove the claim for i = 2. Let s ∈ Y 2 . It suffices to show that s ∈ X 2 . By Proposition
. Then t ′′ = s which concludes the claim for i = 2.
The induction step is proved analogously. This concludes the claim and the proof.
Let us now prove our second claim.
Proof. Let φ ∈ FO(= (. . .), ⊥ c , ⊆). Again, we can assume that φ is of the form ∀ xψ, where x = x 1 . . . x n and ψ is of the form ∃ yθ for θ quantifier-free and in FO(⊥). Let now p, q be two variables not occurring in φ. We state that φ is equivalent to In particular, this implies that h n (x 1 . . . x n ) = m 1 . . . m n ; and since we started from an arbitrary choice of m 1 . . . m n , we can conclude that Y ( x) = M | x| . But then the restriction of Y to x is precisely {∅}[M/ x]; and since M |= Y ψ, by locality we have that M |= ∀ xψ, as required.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the expressive power of fragments of inclusion and independence logic obtained by restricting the arity of non first-order atoms or the number of universal quantifiers. For the first kind of restriction, we adapted and extended the hierarchy theorems of [7] to this new setting; but for the second kind of restriction, we showed that the hierarchy collapses at a very low level if our logic contains at least pure independence atoms.
A question which is still open is whether the fragments FO(⊆)(k∀) of inclusion logic give rise to an infinite expressivity hierarchy. Another issue that requires further investigation is to which degree our results can be adapted to the case of strict semantics. The exact nature of the relationship between strict and lax semantics is a matter which is of no small interest for the further development of the area, and a comparison of the properties of our fragments in these two settings might prove itself of great value.
